Voting for redistribution under desert-sensitive altruism by Luttens, Roland Iwan & Valfort, Anne-Marie
2008/53 
 
 
■ 
 
 
Voting for redistribution  
under desert-sensitive altruism 
 
 
Roland Iwan Luttens and Marie-Anne Valfort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORE 
Voie du Roman Pays 34 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Tel (32 10) 47 43 04 
Fax (32 10) 47 43 01 
E-mail: corestat-library@uclouvain.be 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-44508.html 
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER   
2008/53 
 
Voting for redistribution under desert-sensitive altruism 
 
Roland Iwan LUTTENS 1 and Marie-Anne VALFORT2  
 
 
October 2008 
 
Abstract 
 
We endow individuals that differ in skill levels and tastes for working with altruistic 
preferences for redistribution in a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive 
parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. When altruistic preferences 
are desert-sensitive, i.e. when there is a reluctance to redistribute from the hard-working to 
the lazy, we show that lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium. We 
provide empirical evidence, based on the ISSP 1992 dataset, that preferences for 
redistribution are not purely selfish and that desert-sensitive motivations play a significant 
role. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are significantly more desert-sensitive 
in the US than in Europe. We believe that differences in desert-sensitive preferences for 
redistribution help explain the different social contracts that prevail in both continents. 
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1 Introduction
The United States and continental Western Europe (Europehenceforth) show
considerable di¤erences in their social contracts. Government expenditures on
subsidies and transfers as a percentage of GDP have been consistently lower in
the US between 1970 and 1998 and the discrepancy between both continents
has ever been increasing. At the same time, the US has a signicantly higher
pre-tax income inequality; see Alesina et al. (2001) for an extensive discussion.
The coexistence of high (resp. low) pre-tax income inequality and low (resp. high)
levels of redistribution constitutes an interesting puzzle for economists. It seems
to invalidate the theoretical predictions of Meltzer and Richards seminal paper
(1981) according to which  under realistic assumptions about the distribution
of pre-tax income higher income inequality makes the median voter benet
more from redistribution, leading to higher levels of redistribution in political
equilibrium. Ever since, an increasing research has been devoted to identifying
under which conditions politico-economic equilibria emerge where a low level of
redistribution is chosen by rational agents in economies showing a high level of
pre-tax income inequality.
Several groups of papers have triggered o¤ particular attention among schol-
ars. Corneo and Grüner (2000) show that limits to redistribution may arise
when economic inequality has an informational value. While pecuniary incen-
tives make the middle class willing to increase the extent of redistribution, a
social incentive to avoid a mix with the underclassmay push in the opposite
direction; see Vigdor (2006) for a related argument. Benabou and Ok (2001)
demonstrate how the Prospect of Upward Mobility(the so called POUM e¤ect)
induces people with a low income to oppose redistribution, because they believe
that they or their o¤spring will make it up the income ladder. Hence, low levels
of redistribution are consistent with high pre-tax income inequalities as soon as
the POUM e¤ect is important. However, the upward income mobility argument
to explain di¤erences in social contracts between Europe and the United States
lacks empirical justication. Empirical conclusions of whether or not upward
income mobility is higher in the United States than in Europe over the last 30
years have been very contradictory; we refer to Fields and Ok (1999) for an
overview. Piketty (1995) initiated a research track that focuses on the impact
of individualsbeliefs on the relative importance of e¤ort and luck in generating
income inequalities. This approach receives empirical support in turn. Alesina
et al. (2001) demonstrate that beliefs on the determinants of pre-tax income in-
equalities are strongly correlated with levels of redistribution. They recall that,
according to the World Value Survey, 71% of Americans vs. 40% of Europeans
agree with the opinion that poor people could become rich if they just tried
hard enoughand hence believe that e¤ort is the main determinant of pre-tax
income.
But through which channels are beliefs on the determinants of pre-tax income
inequalities and redistribution levels mutually reinforcing? Benabou and Tirole
(2006) start from an evidence widely acknowledged by psychologists that people
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need to believe in a just world  where hard work pays back and everyone
receives their just desert in the long run so as to motivate themselves and
their children towards exerting e¤ort. Two politico-economic equilibria emerge.
A high prevalence of just-world beliefs is consistent with low redistribution which
increases the cost of low e¤ort and therefore reinforces the need for just-world
beliefs (this stands for the American equilibrium). Conversely, a low prevalence
of just-world beliefs is consistent with high redistribution levels that reduce the
cost of low e¤ort and therefore makes the need for just beliefs less essential (this
stands for the European equilibrium). Alesina and Angeletos (2005) concentrate
on ethical motivations where voterspreferences are driven both by self-interest
and a concern for fairness. They dene this concern for fairness as a social
preference for reducing the degree of inequality induced by luck and unworthy
activities, while rewarding individual talent and e¤ort. Again, two politico-
economic equilibria emerge. In a rst (resp. second) equilibrium, redistribution
is high (resp. low), which leads to a low (resp. high) labor supply. This in turn
induces that a large component of income is due to luck (resp. e¤ort), which
ultimately makes high (resp. low) redistribution desirable for people concerned
by fairness motivations.
The inclusion of fairness concerns in voterspreferences is a promising track for
future research that is backed by strong theoretical and empirical arguments.
The concept of ethical votingdates back to the seminal work of Goodin and
Roberts (1975) who describe the ethical voteras a rational agent who, contrary
to Downshomo politicus (1957), is not only motivated by self-interest but also
by ethical concerns (what he considers as fair for the society as a whole) in his
political choice.
On the theoretical side, three main arguments can be distinguished. The stan-
dard argument states that, if civic duty plays the major role in citizensdecision
to go to the poll  see Blais (2000) for strong empirical evidence then why
should people not vote in an ethical way once in the booth. Second, Goodin and
Roberts (1975) stress that, since the probability of being pivotal is close to zero,
voters may be indi¤erent between giving in to their self-interest or abiding by
their ethical concerns. In both cases, their expected benet converges to zero.
Under such circumstances, following Hume (1739), voters should be able to fol-
low the requirements of Smiths impartial spectator (1790) and show benevolence
towards his fellow citizens precisely because his own interests are not directly
at stake. More precisely, as pivot probabilities decrease, the temptation to vote
ethically may become stronger than the temptation to vote egoistically because
voting ethically gives individuals an additional warm glowpayo¤; we refer to
Andreoni (2006) and Feddersen et al. (2007) for theoretical and experimental
support. A third argument, proposed by Edlin et al. (2006), demonstrates that
ethical voting enables to rationally explain why people massively go to the poll
(without relying on the standard civic duty argument) since the expected bene-
t of voting may no longer converge to zero anymore when citizens do not only
care about their own benet but also about the sum of the benets of all their
fellow citizens.
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On the empirical side, much evidence of ethical concerns has been given, ir-
respective of whether one considers Downs retrospective or spatial theory of
voting (1957). Concerning retrospective voting, Fiorina (1978) points out that
citizensdecision to vote for the incumbent depends less on the evolution of their
personal economic situation during the incumbents political mandate than on
the economic evolution of the country as a whole. Kinder and Kiewet (1981)
and Lewis-Beck (1986) show that this assertion holds even when the countrys
economic evolution and the individuals economic evolution are not correlated,
which betrays that ethical concerns are not a way to rationalize self-interest in
an ethical manner. We refer to Lewin (1991) for a survey on ethical retrospective
voting. Concerning spatial voting, Sears et al. (1980) show that the inuence
of ideology on citizens votes is stronger than the impact of their short-term
material self-interest. Here again, Hudson and Jones (1994, 2002) conrm that
this assertion holds even when what is best for the society as a whole(which
drives ideology) and what is best for me (which drives selshness) are very
di¤erent.
In this paper, we model altruistic preferences for redistribution in line with re-
sults that explain ethical behavior in experimental allocation problems. Char-
ness and Rabin (2002) provide strong experimental justication of social wel-
faremodels  where people like to increase the social surplus (which we denote
in this paper as a utilitarian motive), caring especially about individuals with
low payo¤s (which we denote a Rawlsian motive) over di¤erence aversion
models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), where individuals are motivated to reduce
di¤erences between theirs and otherspayo¤s. Konow (2000) provides evidence
that individuals do not only use utility information in the evaluation of di¤er-
ent social states but also care about the underlying sources that cause utility
di¤erences. Individuals tend to make a clear distinction between utility di¤er-
ences that are due to di¤erences in characteristics within the responsibility of
the individual (e.g. e¤ort, preferences, tastes) and utility di¤erences that are
due to di¤erences in characteristics beyond the responsibility of the individual
(e.g. innate skills, talents, parental background). Individuals dislike these latter
di¤erences in general, whereas they are neutral towards the former di¤erences.
Konow performs several variations of the dictator game where the dictator de-
cides about the division of joint earnings between an anonymous counterpart
and himself. In the treatment where the joint earnings are exogenously given,
the sharing rule chosen by dictators endorses the equal split of joint earnings. On
the contrary, in the treatment where the joint earnings are proportional to the
e¤ort exerted by both individuals during a previous real task phase, dictators
refuse to compensate their counterparts for their poor performance. Recently,
Fong (2007) analyses donorsbehavior in a charity game where beneciaries are
real life welfare recipients. She nds out that donors who yet claim to feel con-
cerned about the well-being of others give signicantly less than donors showing
a lower degree of altruism as soon as they receive signals that their recipient
may be lazy. In this paper, we assume that ethical preferences for redistribution
are such that individuals no longer simply include all individuals (utilitarian
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motive) or the worst-o¤ individual only (Rawlsian motive) in their altruistic
concerns. We allow individuals to exclude others from their altruistic concerns
when they feel that these others have performed poorly compared to themselves
in terms of responsibility characteristics. We denote such altruistic preferences
desert-sensitive altruistic preferences, because this way of modelling ethical
preferences for redistribution resembles with Arnesons (1999, 2000) normative
desert-sensitiveprioritarian theory of distributive justice, which is based on
the idea that individuals should obtain the level of well-being that they de-
serve in view of their responsibility characteristics. Broadly speaking, under
desert-sensitive preferences for redistribution, hard-working individuals oppose
redistribution from the hard-working to the lazy.
We argue that preferences for redistribution are more desert-sensitive among
individuals in the US than among individuals in Europe. We see two apparent
explanations (see Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for an
extensive discussion). First, the myth of the US being the land of opportunity
greatly entrenched its customs. Meanwhile, European perceptions are inuenced
by the historical (from medieval times till the nineteenth century) division of
society into classes, where birth and nobility were the main determinants of
wealth and success. Second, the American belief of undeservingness of the
poor may reect racial prejudice against the black minority. Poor white voters
might reduce their support for redistribution when they believe that poor black
citizens also benet from redistribution (see Luttmer (2001) for strong empirical
evidence). Roemer et al. (2007) nd out that marginal income taxes would have
been much higher when racial prejudice would have been absent. They believe
that racial prejudice is the major underlying factor explaining why in the US,
while the past twenty years were characterized by a sharp rise in inequality, the
e¤ective marginal income taxes have fallen.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold.
On a theoretical level, we study a simple voting model where a unidimensional
redistributive parameter is chosen by majority voting in a direct democracy. We
allow for heterogeneities in productivities and preferences for consumption and
leisure and incorporate the incentive e¤ects of taxation. We model individuals
altruistic preferences for redistribution as described by social welfare models; for
an alternative approach, we refer to Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) who study
voting for redistribution in a model where altruistic preferences are based on
di¤erence aversion models. We study four di¤erent scenarios of altruistic pref-
erences for redistribution: we endow individuals with altruistic preferences that
are either driven by a utilitarian motivation or by a Rawlsian motivation and
altruistic preferences can be either desert-sensitive or not. We compare the
di¤erent equilibrium levels of redistribution that emerge when individuals are
endowed with these di¤erent altruistic preferences for redistribution. We show
that in a society where altruistic preferences are desert-sensitive, (i) strictly
lower levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium compared to a so-
ciety where altruistic preferences are desert-insensitive and (ii) lower or equal
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levels of redistribution emerge in political equilibrium compared to a society
where preferences for redistribution are purely egoistic.
On an empirical level, using the ISSP 1992 dataset, we provide evidence that
preferences for redistribution are not purely egoistic. We nd that desert-
sensitive motivations play a signicant role in individuals preferences for re-
distribution. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are signicantly
more desert-sensitive among individuals in the US than among individuals in
Europe. We therefore believe that di¤erences in desert-sensitivity help explain
the di¤erent social contracts that prevail between both continents.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and introduces
the di¤erent scenarios of altruistic preferences for redistribution. Section 3 com-
pares the di¤erent equilibrium levels of redistribution that emerge under these
di¤erent scenarios. Section 4 deals with desert-sensitivity in practice and justi-
es desert-sensitive altruistic preferences for redistribution empirically. Section
5 summarizes our major conclusions and highlights di¤erent avenues for future
research. In Appendix A, we return to the theoretical analysis of Section 3
and study the impact of incomplete information on the equilibrium levels of
redistribution when altruistic preferences for redistribution are utilitarian and
desert-sensitive. Appendix B provides a detailed descriptive summary and a
correlation matrix of the data used in Section 4.
2 The model
2.1 Individual characteristics
To keep our analysis simple, all individuals can only di¤er in two binary at-
tributes. The rst is their productive skill level w: individuals are either low-
skilledor high-skilled, i.e. w 2W = fw;wg, with 0 < w < w  1. The second
is their taste for working e: individuals are either lazyor hard-working, i.e.
e 2 E = fe; eg, with 0 < e < e  1. Hence, every individual belongs to one of
four types (w; e) 2W E. We assume throughout the paper that W and E are
xed and given. We assume that the view of society is such that people believe
that di¤erences in w are linked to a genetic endowment and hence fall beyond
the responsibility of the individual. On the other hand, people (may) hold indi-
viduals responsible for di¤erences in the preference parameter e (cfr. infra).4 For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that w and e are independently distributed.
Denote pwe the proportion of individuals of type (w; e);
P
(w;e)2WE pwe = 1.
4This responsibility cut (Dworkin, 1981) is common in the theoretical literature on
fair redistribution and the empirical literature on individual opinions on distributive justice
(e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and the references cited therein). However, one could
argue that individuals should be held responsible for di¤erences in w as they di¤erently in-
vest in human capital and that individuals are not responsible for di¤erences in e which may
result from having small children, being old or having bad health. We want to stress that the
qualitative results of our model do not change when the responsibility cut is reversed once the
denition of desert-sensitive altruism is altered accordingly (cfr. infra).
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Table 1 summarizes:
pwe e e
w  (1  ) 
w (1  ) (1  )(1  ) 1  
 1   1
Table 1: proportions of types.
where  and  belong to the open interval between 0 and 1 and denote the
proportion of lazy individuals and the proportion of low-skilled individuals re-
spectively. A generic economy is described by " = (; ).
2.2 Private preferences for consumption and leisure
The productive skill level denes gross income in the usual multiplicative way:
for any type (w; e), given an amount of labor `we 2 [0; 1], gross income ywe
equals w`we.
The government redistributes income through a basic income - at tax schedule.
Denote the constant marginal tax rate  2 [0; 1] and the corresponding basic
income B() = ya, where ya =
P
(w;e)2WE pweywe denotes average gross
income. Denote median income by ymed. Consumption cwe equals B() +
(1  )w`we.
Taking the redistributive policy of the government (i.e.  and B()) as given,
labor supply is determined on the basis of private preferences. For analytical
tractability, we discard income e¤ects and assume, for any type (w; e), quasi-
linear preferences between cwe and `we to take the form:
ue = cwe   1
2
1
e
`2we: (1)
Hence, taste for working denes the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and supplied labor.5
Maximization of (1) with respect to ` yields for an individual of type (w; e):
`we = (1  )we.
and thus the following gross income:
ywe = (1  )w2e
5The marginal rates of substitution for two types of individuals with di¤erent tastes for
working are always a constant multiple of each other. Therefore, their indi¤erence curves
satisfy the (Spence-Mirrlees) single crossing property.
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and net income (=consumption):
cwe = B() + (1  )2 w2e.
Private preference satisfaction is measured by the indirect utility function:
vwe = B() +
1
2 (1  )2 w2e.
Similar to Boadway et al. (2002), we assume that the individuals (and the
government) only observe three di¤erent income classes  the poor (with ywe),
the middle-class (with y we = ywe) and the rich (with y we) together with
their respective proportions pwe; p we + pwe and p we. The supports of w and
e are known but w; e and `we cannot be observed on an individual basis. As
a result, types (w; e) and ( w; e) can be inferred from observing ywe and y we
respectively, but types ( w; e) and (w; e) cannot be distinguished, since y we equals
ywe.6 For the moment, we leave the question open whether individuals know
that w and e are independently distributed or not. We show in Appendix A
that knowing whether w and e are independently distributed or not plays a
crucial role in forming beliefs about the separate proportions p we and pwe of the
indistinguishable middle types ( w; e) and (w; e).
2.3 Altruistic preferences for redistribution
We consider a direct democracy in which the redistributive parameter  is chosen
by simple majority voting. Individuals fully anticipate the disincentive e¤ects
of income taxation on labor supply. Individualsevaluations of alternative re-
distributive policies are based on additive extended indirect utility functions.
We present throughout the paper di¤erent specications of altruism, but the
generic form follows the social welfare model of Charness and Rabin (2002).
Denote the vector v   vwe; v we; vwe; v we the type-prole of indirect utilities.
Let vT be the transpose of v. Let  2 [0; 1] be a parameter (the same for
all individuals) that reects the weight put on the private indirect utility in the
social indirect utility function. Consider two (possibly identical) types (w; e) and
(w0; e0). Denote we;w0e0 the weight that an individual of type (w; e) assigns in
her social indirect utility function to the private indirect utility of an individual
of type (w0; e0). For any type (w; e),
P
(w0;e0)2WE we;w0e0 = 1. The vector
we 
 
we;we; we; we; we;we; we; we

collects type (w; e)s weights. Then, for
any type (w; e), preference satisfaction for redistribution is given by:
Vwe=vwe + (1  )wevT. (2)
We denote preferences for redistribution altruistic whenever  6= 1.
6That types ( w; e) and (w; e) are indistinguishable exemplies the real life problem for any
policy maker that incomes do not reveal personal characteristics.
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2.4 Di¤erent scenarios of altruism
We discuss di¤erent altruistic preferences for redistribution. We assume that
we can write we;w0e0 as
we;w0e0  we;w0e0pw0e0P
(w0;e0)2WE we;w0e0pw0e0
where we;w0e0 2 f0; 1g is a dummy variable that represents the type-specic
concern that individuals of type (w; e) have for individuals of type (w0; e0).
Whether the concern of one individual for another individual takes the value
of 1 or 0  or, in other words, whether another individuals private indirect
utility enters one individuals social indirect utility or not depends on two
factors: 1) whether individuals are utilitarian altruist or Rawlsian altruist and
2) whether individuals are desert-sensitive or not. We clarify both notions. We
qualify individualsaltruistic preferences for redistribution utilitarian altruist in
case individuals do not discriminate on the basis of private indirect utilities and
hence all other individualsprivate indirect utilities are taken up in their own
social indirect utility function. We qualify individualsaltruistic preferences for
redistribution Rawlsian altruist in case individuals do discriminate on the basis
of private indirect utilities and only individuals with the lowest private indirect
utilities are taken up in their own social indirect utility function.7 In addition,
we qualify individualsaltruistic preferences for redistribution desert-sensitive
when individuals do discriminate on the basis of taste for working and only
private indirect utilities of individuals with at least the same taste for working
are taken up in their own social indirect utility function. We qualify individuals
altruistic preferences for redistribution desert-insensitive when individuals do
not discriminate on the basis of taste for working when taking up other private
indirect utilities in their own social indirect utility function (in other words,
taste for working is treated, as productive skill, without discrimination).
Putting both notions together, we consider throughout the paper four di¤erent
altruistic scenarios: desert-insensitive utilitarian altruism (in short: utilitarian
altruism (U)), desert-insensitive Rawlsian altruism (in short: Rawlsian altruism
(R)), desert-sensitive utilitarian altruism (dsU) and desert-sensitive Rawlsian
altruism (dsR). We denote, in addition, the scenario where all preferences for
redistribution are egoistic ( equals 1 for all individuals) by Ego. Hence, the set
of all di¤erent scenarios considered in this paper is  = fEgo; U;R; dsU; dsRg.
Generically, let iwe 
 
we;we; we;we; we;we; we;we

be the vector of concern-
parameters of an individual of type (w; e) for a scenario i 2 nfEgog.
Our four altruistic scenarios read as follows:
7Over the years, Rawlsideas have been reinterpreted by economists into utility terms (as
we do here), although Rawls himself clearly never advocated this. He proposed to measure
individual well-being in terms of primary goods rather than in terms of preference satisfaction.
9
 Utilitarian altruism
Under utilitarian altruism, every individuals social indirect utility is a convex
combination of her own private indirect utility and the average of the private
indirect utilities of all other individuals. Hence, all concern-parameters take the
value of 1, or Uwe = (1; 1; 1; 1) for all (w; e) 2W  E.
 Rawlsian altruism
Under Rawlsian altruism, every individuals social indirect utility is a convex
combination of her own private indirect utility and the lowest private indirect
utility in society. It is easy to check that individuals of type (w; e) have the
lowest private indirect utility (cfr. Section 2.2). Hence, Rwe = (1; 0; 0; 0) for all
(w; e) 2W  E.
 Desert-sensitive utilitarian altruism
Under desert-sensitive utilitarian altruism, every individuals social indirect util-
ity is a convex combination of her own private indirect utility and the average
of the private indirect utilities of all individuals that have at least the same
taste for working. Hence, the vector of concern-parameters of lazy individuals
does not change compared to the utilitarian altruism scenario. On the other
hand, the vector of concern-parameters of hard-working individuals changes
since these individuals exclude under this scenario lazy individuals from their
social indirect utility function. Hence, we get dsUwe = 
dsU
we = (1; 1; 1; 1) and
dsUwe = 
dsU
we = (0; 0; 1; 1).
 Desert-sensitive Rawlsian altruism
Under desert-sensitive Rawlsian altruism, every individuals social indirect util-
ity is a convex combination of her own private indirect utility and the lowest
private indirect utility of individuals that have at least the same taste for work-
ing. Hence, the vector of concern-parameters of lazy individuals does not change
compared to the Rawlsian altruism scenario. On the other hand, the vector of
concern-parameters of hard-working individuals changes since these individu-
als under this scenario (i) exclude lazy low-skilled individuals from their social
indirect utility function and (ii) take up hard-working low-skilled individuals
instead. Hence, we get dsRwe = 
dsR
we = (1; 0; 0; 0) and 
dsR
we = 
dsR
we = (0; 0; 1; 0).
3 Political equilibrium
Under simplifying assumptions, we show in this section that the amount of redis-
tribution in political equilibrium is higher under the Rawlsian altruism scenario
than under the egoistic scenario and higher under the egoistic scenario than
under the utilitarian altruism scenario. Furthermore, we show that the intro-
duction of desert-sensitivity in (utilitarian or Rawlsian) altruistic preferences for
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redistribution decreases the amount of redistribution in the political equilibrium
when the median voter is of the hard-working low-skilled type.
We only focus the analysis on economies where (i) neither the poor, nor the rich
comprise more than one half of the total population (i.e. pwe < 1=2 and p we <
1=2) and (ii) median income is strictly lower than average income. The rst
assumption ensures that median voter power goes to the middle-class, while the
second assumption rules out corner solutions in the calculations of the preferred
tax rates of the middle-class.8 Denote E the set of all economies that satisfy
both assumptions.
3.1 Preferred tax rates
Denote  i;"we the preferred tax rate of an individual of type (w; e) under scenario
i 2  in economy " 2 E . The preferred tax rates follow from maximization
of (2) with respect to  , using the appropriate vector of concern parameters
for each type (w; e) in each scenario. It is easy to check that (i) for all types,
for each scenario and for all economies in E preferences for redistribution are
single peaked over the  -dimension, (ii) for each scenario the preferred tax rates
of individuals of type (w; e) are strictly larger than the preferred tax rates of
individuals of type ( w; e), i.e.  i;"we > 
i;"
we for all i 2  and all " 2 E and (iii)
for each scenario the preferred tax rates of individuals of type ( w; e) are strictly
lower than the preferred tax rates of individuals of type (w; e), i.e.  i;"we > 
i;"
we
for all i 2  and for all " 2 E . Table 2 presents for each scenario and for all
economies in E the preferred tax rates of the middle types ( w; e) and (w; e).
 i;"we we we
Ego ya ymed2ya ymed
ya ymed
2ya ymed
U ya ymed (1 )ya2ya ymed (1 )ya
ya ymed (1 )ya
2ya ymed (1 )ya
R
ya ymed (1 )ywe
2ya ymed (1 )ywe
ya ymed (1 )ywe
2ya ymed (1 )ywe
dsU ya ymed (1 )ya2ya ymed (1 )ya max
"
0;
ya ymed  (1 )
pb
we
+(1 )(1 ) (p
b
weymed+(1 )(1 )ywe)
2ya ymed  (1 )
pb
we
+(1 )(1 ) (p
b
weymed+(1 )(1 )ywe)
#
dsR
ya ymed (1 )ywe
2ya ymed (1 )ywe
ya ymed
2ya ymed
Table 2: Preferred tax rates of middle types ( w; e) and (w; e).
8Besides, we recall that it is a stylized fact of real-life income distributions that ymed < ya.
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In Table 2, pbwe denotes the beliefs of individuals of type (w; e) about the pro-
portion of individuals of type (w; e) in the population. Indeed, in the desert-
sensitive utilitarian scenario, individuals of type (w; e) take up in their social
utility function both individuals of their own type (w; e) and individuals of
type ( w; e). While they observe the latters proportion p we, they only observe
p we + pwe and hence have to make an estimate of the formers proper pro-
portion pwe. We return to the exact formation of pbwe in Appendix A, where
we study the impact of di¤erences between beliefs pbwe and actual proportions
pwe on the preferred tax rate of individuals of type (w; e) in the desert-sensitive
utilitarian scenario. From the way we dened in section 2.4 the concern para-
meters of the di¤erent types in the di¤erent scenarios, it is a matter of course
that (i) the preferred tax rates of the middle types ( w; e) and (w; e) coincide in
the egoistic scenario, the utilitarian altruism scenario and the Rawlsian altruism
scenario, (ii) the preferred tax rates of individuals of type ( w; e) do not change
between desert-sensitive and desert-insensitive scenarios, i.e. U;"we = 
dsU;"
we and
R;"we = 
dsR;"
we and (iii) the preferred tax rates of individuals of type (w; e) are the
same in the egoistic scenario and the desert-sensitive Rawlsian altruism scenario,
i.e. Ego;"we = 
dsR;"
we .
9
3.2 Ranking Condorcet winner tax rates
Denote ~ i;" the Condorcet winner tax rate under scenario i 2  in economy
" 2 E . Remember that we assumed that pwe < 1=2 and p we < 1=2 for all
economies in E . Let E 0 = f" 2 E : pwe + pwe  1=2g be the proper subset of E
that comprises all economies where the proportion of lazy individuals does not
exceed 1=2. Let E 00 = f" 2 E : pwe + pwe > 1=2g be the proper subset of E
that comprises all economies where the proportion of lazy individuals exceeds
1=2. Remark that E 0 and E 00 partition E . The following lemma states that,
for all scenarios considered, the preferred tax rates of types (w; e) and ( w; e) of
table 2 are also the Condorcet winner tax rates for all economies in E 0 and E 00
respectively.
Lemma (identication Condorcet winner tax rate): 8i 2  :
8" 2 E 0; ~ i;" =  i;"we
8" 2 E 00; ~ i;" =  i;"we.
Proof: To ensure that the median voter has type (w; e) for all " 2 E 0 and
that the median voter has type ( w; e) for all " 2 E 00, we need to show that
 i;"we   i;"we for all i 2  and for all " 2 E . We already mentioned that  i;"we =  i;"we
for all i 2 fEgo; U;Rg and for all " 2 E . When noting that ymed > ywe,
it is easily seen that dsR;"we > 
dsR;"
we for all " 2 E . It remains to show that
9Note that the preferred tax rate of the middle types in the egoistic scenario coincides with
the preferred tax rate of the middle types in a scenario where the middle types take up each
others private utilities into their social utility function, i.e.  we = we = (0; 1; 1; 0).
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dsU;"we  dsU;"we for all " 2 E when dsU;"we > 0. This boils down to showing that
ya  p
b
weymed+(1 )(1 )ywe
pbwe+(1 )(1 )
= RHS. Since pbwe cannot lie outside the interval
[0; 1   pwe   p we] (see also Appendix A), pbwe + (1   )(1   ) < 1. Hence, it
can easily be seen that ya < RHS when noting that the weight given to ywe
in RHS is greater than the weight (1  )(1  ) given to ywe in ya and when
noting that ywe receives no weight in RHS, whereas ywe receives weight  in
ya. 
From the lemma and table 2, we can infer that the desert-sensitive Condorcet
winner tax rates are di¤erent from the desert-insensitive Condorcet winner tax
rates in economies belonging to E 0 while desert-sensitivity does not change Con-
dorcet winner tax rates in economies belonging to E 00.
The main result of this section is the following proposition that provides a
complete ranking for the Condorcet winner tax rates over the di¤erent scenarios
for di¤erent sets of economies. The proposition holds for all pbwe 2 [0; 1  pwe  
p we] and for all  2 (0; 1).10
Proposition (ranking Condorcet winner tax rates):
8" 2 E 0; 0  ~dsU;" < ~U;" < ~Ego;" = ~dsR;" < ~R;".
8" 2 E 00; 0 < ~dsU;" = ~U;" < ~Ego;" < ~dsR;" = ~R;".
Proof: The proof that ~U;" < ~Ego;" < ~R;" for all " 2 E follows straightfor-
wardly since we assume that ywe < ywe = ywe = ymed < ya for all " 2 E . Note
that ~U;" > 0 for all " 2 E when  > 0. The proof that ~dsU;" < ~U;" for all
" 2 E 0 follows from (i) noting that U;"we = dsU;"we for all " 2 E , (ii) the proof
of the lemma where we show that dsU;"we < 
dsU;"
we for all " 2 E and (iii) the
lemma itself. The proof that ~dsR;" < ~R;" for all " 2 E 0 follows from noting
that ~dsR;" = ~Ego;" for all " 2 E 0 and that ~Ego;" < ~R;" for all " 2 E . 
Let us start comparing the Condorcet winner tax rates in the egoistic scenario,
the utilitarian altruism scenario and the Rawlsian altruism scenario. Remem-
ber that for these scenarios, the Condorcet winner tax rates coincide for all
economies in E . The Condorcet winner tax rate is the highest under the Rawl-
sian altruism scenario and the lowest under the utilitarian altruism scenario for
all economies in E . The intuition is that under the Rawlsian altruism scenario,
the median voter middle type individuals (only) take up the private indirect
utilities of type (w; e) individuals in their social indirect utility function. These
type (w; e) individuals egoistically prefer a higher tax rate than the tax rate ego-
istically preferred by the middle type individuals. As a result, the Condorcet
winner tax rate under the Rawlsian altruism scenario is also higher. Given
our quasi-linear preferences dened in (1), the disincentive e¤ect of taxation
10 If  = 0 (i.e. individuals put zero weight on their private indirect utility in their social
indirect utility function), then ~dsU;" = ~U;" = 0 for all " 2 E . If  = 1 (i.e. preferences for
redistribution are not altruistic), then ~dsU;" = ~U;" = ~dsR;" = ~R;" = ~Ego;" for all " 2 E .
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is minimized  and therefore the total sum of utilities maximized under a
tax rate equal to zero. As a result, the Condorcet winner tax rate under the
utilitarian altruism scenario is lower than the tax rate egoistically preferred by
the middle type individuals. Note however that the Condorcet winner tax rate
under the utilitarian altruism scenario does not equal zero as long as individuals
do not put zero weight on their private indirect utility in their social indirect
utility function (cfr. footnote 7). The introduction of desert-sensitivity in al-
truistic preferences for redistribution decreases the amount of redistribution in
the political equilibrium when the median voter is a hard-working low-skilled
individual. This result holds both when all individuals are utilitarian altruist as
when all individuals are Rawlsian altruist. The intuition is that hard-working
low-skilled individuals essentially drop the private indirect utilities of type (w; e)
individuals, who have the highest egoistically preferred tax rate, from their so-
cial indirect utility function under desert-sensitive scenarios.11 This results in
lower Condorcet winner tax rates compared to desert-insensitive scenarios.
3.3 Testable hypotheses
How can our stylized model help explain the di¤erences between the Ameri-
can and the European social contract? Our theoretical results present several
possible explanations. Let us highlight some of them.
One possibility is that, although individuals in the US and in Europe (EU) have
the same altruistic concerns (in the sense that they are all either desert-sensitive
utilitarian altruists or desert-sensitive Rawlsian altruists), the median voter of
both economies is of a di¤erent type (in the sense that desert-sensitivity lowers
the Condorcet winner tax rate in the US but not in Europe). Indeed, from our
proposition, it follows that: if US 2 E 0 and EU 2 E 00, then ~dsU;US < ~dsU;EU
and ~dsR;US < ~dsR;EU . Obviously, this controversial explanation is di¢ cult to
conrm empirically as it is hard to imagine that personal characteristics such as
skills and tastes for working are distributed signicantly di¤erently in the US
than in Europe.
In our opinion, a more promising route is to assume identical median voters
(whose preferred desert-sensitive tax rates are lower than her preferred desert-
insensitive tax rates) in both economies and to focus on di¤erences in altruistic
concerns between Americans and Europeans. We explicitly formulate three
testable hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 states that both continents share the same (utilitarian or Rawlsian)
altruistic concerns but that Americans are desert-sensitive while Europeans are
desert-insensitive. Indeed, from our proposition, it follows that: if US and
EU 2 E 0, then ~dsU;US < ~U;EU and ~dsR;US < ~R;EU .
11Obviously, in the scenario where the lazy high-skilled individuals mimic the concern-
parameters of the hard-working low-skilled individuals in the desert-sensitive scenarios, the
result that ~dsU;" < ~U;" and ~dsR;" < ~R;" holds for all economies in E .
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Hypothesis 2 states that Americans and Europeans are both desert-insensitive
but that Americans assign a lower weight to their private indirect utilities and
hence a higher weight to their utilitarian altruistic concerns in their social in-
direct utility function. Indeed, since @~
U;"
@ > 0 for all " 2 E , it follows that: if
US < EU , then ~
U;US < ~U;EU (this result holds for US and EU 2 E).12
Hypothesis 3 states that Americans and Europeans are both desert-sensitive
but that Americans assign a lower weight to their private indirect utilities and
hence a higher weight to their desert-sensitive utilitarian altruistic concerns in
their social indirect utility function. Indeed, since @~
dsU;"
@ > 0 for all " 2 E , it
follows that: if US < EU , then ~
dsU;US < ~dsU;EU (this result holds for US
and EU 2 E).13
An empirical test of these hypotheses is the topic of the next section.
4 Desert-sensitive altruism in practice
In this section we demonstrate that from the three hypotheses stated above, we
especially nd empirical support for hypothesis 3. In other words, we show that
(i) preferences for redistribution are not purely egoistic, (ii) desert-sensitive mo-
tivations play a role in the altruistic concerns of both Americans and Europeans,
(iii) di¤erences in desert-sensitivity hold between both continents: Americans
seem to be more desert-sensitive than Europeans, inducing lower support for
redistribution in the US than in Europe.
4.1 Data
The empirical source used to obtain individual data on attitudes toward political
redistribution is the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Social In-
equality II Module (1992). It reveals opinions on social inequality of representa-
tive samples of ten Western democracies which are obtained through a simple or
multiple stage randomization method. We retain the US and the four European
countries where the respondents were submitted to the full set of questions com-
posing the ISSP survey: (West-)Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Norway14 .
Except for Italy where it was conducted through face to face interviews, the
questionnaire was mailed back by the respondents after self-completion. The
average response rate is 58%, ranging from 50% in (West-)Germany to 84% in
12Hypothesis 2 has to be reformulated for Rawlsian altruistic concerns: since @~
R;"
@
< 0 for
all " 2 E , it follows that: if EU < US , then ~R;US < ~R;EU .
13Note that this hypothesis cannot be reformulated for desert-sensitive Rawlsian altruistic
concerns, because if US and EU 2 E 0, then ~dsR;" = ~Ego;" for all " 2 E 0.
14Note that these countries are representative of the three types of welfare states in which
modern developed capitalist nations cluster. Following the typology established by Esping-
Andersen (1990), Great Britain stands for the liberal type, Norway for the socio-democratic
type, and (West-)Germany and Italy for the continental and Mediterranean versions of the
conservative type.
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Norway. Our empirical estimates are based on a minimum of 4,007 observations
(our samplehenceforth) depending on our econometric specication. These
observations are split up as follows across our countries of interest: 1,198 for
(West-)Germany, 467 for Great Britain, 554 for Italy, 1,073 for Norway and 715
for US.
Answers to the survey question V57 constitute the empirical dependent variable
that we use to recover the individual preferences for political redistribution.
More precisely, survey question V57 asks individuals whether they agree with
the following statement: It is the responsibility of the government to reduce
the di¤erences in income between people with high incomes and those with low
incomes. Respondents choose strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor dis-
agree, disagreeor strongly disagree. We categorize our explanatory variables
in four groups. First, the variable self-interest captures the self-interest in-
centive of individuals to support redistribution. It measures subjectively how
much individuals themselves gain from a reduction in income inequality based
on the survey question V84. This question asks individuals how they believe
their income would be a¤ected if incomes became more equal. Respondents
choose whether their income would denitely go up, would probably go up,
would stay the same, would probably go downor would denitely go down.
Second, the variable poumtries to capture the prospect of upward mobility
introduced by Benabou and Ok (2001). Expectations about future mobility are
instrumented by looking at the individuals history of mobility, based on the
di¤erence between the respondents current income and standard of living and
those of her father provided by the survey question V75. This question is as
follows: Compared with your father when he was about your age, are you bet-
ter or worse o¤ in your income and standard of living generally?. Respondents
choose much better o¤, better o¤, about equal, worse o¤or much worse
o¤. Third, the variable hard workis derived from individualsopinions on how
strongly hard work, a characteristic within individualsresponsibility, inuences
the income generating process. The hard workvariable is built on the survey
question V9: For getting ahead in life, how important is hard work?. Respon-
dents choose essential, very important, fairly important, not very impor-
tantor not important at all. We consider this variable as key in identifying
whether individuals are desert-sensitive or not. Di¤erent beliefs on the relative
importance of responsibility characteristics versus non-responsibility character-
istics in determining incomes lead to di¤erent demands for redistribution. We
consider the hard workvariable as a ratio between both beliefs, meaning that
a low value of the hard workvariable is associated with a strong (resp. weak)
belief in the importance of non-responsibility (resp. responsibility) characteris-
tics while a high value of the hard workvariable is associated with a strong
(resp. weak) belief in the importance of responsibility (resp. non-responsibility)
characteristics. In this setting, if individuals are desert-sensitive, a low value
of the hard workvariable should be related to a relatively higher support for
redistribution while a high value of the hard workvariable should be related to
a relatively weaker support to redistribution. Fourth, we derive a set of socio-
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demographic variables reporting individualsincome, employment status, level
of education, age, sex and whether they are married or not.
Table 5 in Appendix B reports the frequencies in the sample of the various an-
swers to each of the questions mentioned above. It is worthwhile noting that
in Table 5 about 50% of respondents claim to expect a pecuniary improvement
out of a reduction of inequality. However, more than 60% of respondents think
that inequality should be reduced by the government. Raw data thus suggest
that there is more than self-interest behind individualssupport for redistribu-
tion. We investigate this issue further in the following section dedicated to our
empirical estimates.
4.2 Estimation
We consider the following empirical model:
Ri = Xi + i
where Ri is a latent variable. What we observe is Ri (the answer to question
V57), equal to 1 for individual i if Ri > 0 (the individual answered strongly
agree, agreeor neither agree nor disagree) and 0 otherwise. Xi is a vector
of explanatory variables. Building on the previous discussion, we specify this
vector as:
Xi = (si; pi; hi;Yi);
where si, pi, and hi are the self-interestvariable, the poumvariable and the
hard workvariable respectively which all range from 1 to 5 and Yi is a set of
standard socio-demographic variables. In order to test for di¤erences between
both continents, the poumvariable and the hard workvariable are interacted
with a dummy (US) that takes the value of 1 when individuals live in the US.
We estimate our empirical model as a logit model15 . Table 3 presents our logit
estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the country level and we control
for country xed e¤ects. Regression 1 concentrates on the inuence of self-
interest, poumand socio-demographic variables on the respondentssupport
for redistribution. This regression is intended to represent the most common ex-
planations of individualssupport for redistribution presented in the literature.
Regression 2 analyzes the impact of adding the hard workvariable and repre-
sents our contribution of viewing individuals as being (desert-sensitive) altruists
rather than egoists.
<insert Table 3 about here>
Two important conclusions can be drawn from Table 3.
15Note that constructing the dependent variable as a variable ranging from 1 to 5 and
estimating an ordered logit model yields similar results as estimating a binary logit model.
The same holds true when estimating a binary or an ordered probit model. Estimation results
are available upon request.
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First, although the self-interest variable has strongly signicant explanatory
power in both regressions, it is not the only driving force behind individuals
support for redistribution. The strongly signicant negative coe¢ cient of the
hard workvariable in regression 2 betrays that, besides the self-interest mo-
tive, individuals are desert-sensitive altruists. This means that a weak belief in
the importance of hard work to get ahead in life is related to a relatively higher
support for redistribution while a strong belief in the importance of hard work
to get ahead in life is related to a relatively lower support for redistribution. In
other words, there is a reluctance for redistribution from the hard-working to
the lazy which supports the idea that individuals exclude the lazy from their
altruistic concerns. Note that this nding is in line with previous empirical re-
search on the determinants of individualspreferences for redistribution; besides
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), see Fong (2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002), and
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for more details. We would like to mention that
this belief is equally shared by both individuals who gain or lose from redistri-
bution as the overall correlation between the self-interest variable and the hard
work variable is not signicant (see Table 6 in the Appendix). In other words,
people who dislike redistribution because of self-interest do not systematically
rationalize their egoism by saying that anyone can get ahead in life if they work
hard. This result suggests to depart from modelling individualspreferences for
redistribution as solely egoistic as it indicates that altruistic concerns do truly
exist.
Second, preferences for redistribution are signicantly more desert-sensitive
among individuals in the US than among individuals in Europe. This is in-
dicated by the signicantly negative coe¢ cient of the interaction variable hard
work*US. In other words, our regression results suggest that, even in the hy-
pothetical case of equal beliefs on the importance of hard work on individual
outcomes in both continents, the demand for redistribution would be signi-
cantly lower among Americans than among Europeans. More precisely, based
on our logit estimates, we computed the elasticity, denoted eRi=xji , of the de-
pendent variable Ri with respect to x
j
i , the jth explanatory variable in Xi.
Formally, a logit model implies that eRi=xji =
xjij
1+exp(Xi)
. The elasticity eRi=xji
indicates the variation in percentage of the probability that Ri = 1 induced by
a 1% increase in the value of the explanatory variable xji . Table 4 reports the
elasticities of the dependent variable with respect to each explanatory variable
when the explanatory variables take their mean value.
<insert Table 4 about here>
Table 4 shows that a 1% increase in the average belief on the importance of
hard work among Europeans decreases their ability to support redistribution
by 0.12%. As for the United States, a 1% increase in the average belief on the
importance of hard work decreases the support of Americans for redistribution
by 0.71%. In other words, the negative impact of the hard workvariable on
the willingness to redistribute is almost 6 times higher among Americans than
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among Europeans. We believe that this original nding, which supplements
the conclusions of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) among others, can help explain
the two di¤erent politico-economic equilibria of both continents. Note that
although the coe¢ cient of the poumvariable is negative and signicant at a
10% level, we do not nd any signicant statistical e¤ect of the poum*US
interaction variable. Note also that, while the coe¢ cient of the USvariable is
negative and statistically signicant in regression 1, it is no longer signicant in
regression 2. This suggests that the di¤erence between desert-sensitive altruism
across both continents is a crucial one.
Concerning the socio-demographic variables, the signicant positive sign of the
coe¢ cient of the income_2variable and the signicant negative sign of the
coe¢ cient of the income_5variable conrm the impact of self-interest, as ob-
jectively measured, on individualssupport for redistribution. Inactive people
appear signicantly less supportive for redistribution than employed individuals.
As stressed by Linos and West (2003), literature in sociology hardly concludes
about the inuence of education on attitudes towards redistribution. On the
one hand, higher education induces higher status and greater economic security,
therefore decreasing support for redistribution. On the other hand, higher edu-
cation is also supposed to increase socialization in democratic values, therefore
enhancing support for a more egalitarian distribution of income. Our results
show that higher education has a strongly signicant negative e¤ect on the de-
mand for redistribution. People above 45 are signicantly less likely to support
redistribution. Gender also matters with men being signicantly less support-
ive towards redistribution than women. This is a common empirical nding
that is related to various theories (see Waerness (1987) for a survey). Some
highlight that women are socialized in a way that make them more concerned
about otherswell-being. Others emphasize that women are more likely to be in
precarious positions in the labour market, therefore inducing a stronger demand
for state benets.
5 Conclusion
We endow individuals that di¤er in skill levels and tastes for working with pref-
erences for redistribution that are not purely egoistic. In our model, individuals
care about others, but possibly only as long as these others have at least the
same entitlement to income generated by factors that lie within their personal
responsibility. We denote such a selective concern desert-sensitive altruism. In
a voting model where a unidimensional redistributive parameter is chosen by
majority voting in a direct democracy, we demonstrate how desert-sensitive
preferences for redistribution can induce lower levels of redistribution in the po-
litical equilibrium. We justify desert-sensitive preferences empirically. Using a
representative sample that contains respondents of both the US and Europe, we
provide evidence that preferences for redistribution are not purely egoistic. We
nd that desert-sensitive motivations play a signicant role in individualspref-
erences for redistribution. We estimate that preferences for redistribution are
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signicantly more desert-sensitive among individuals in the US than among in-
dividuals in Europe. We think that di¤erences in desert-sensitivity help explain
the di¤erent social contracts that prevail between both continents.
We believe that our analysis can be extended in a number of promising ways.
We highlight ve possible avenues for future research. First, while recently
an increasing number of theoretical papers depart from modelling individuals
preferences for redistribution as purely egoistic, an extensive empirical validation
for altruistic preferences for redistribution in general and for desert-sensitive
altruistic preferences for redistribution in particular needs to be developed. Such
an analysis should not only be limited to the study of participants behavior in an
experimental setting, nor be solely based on the use of questionnaire data, but
focus more directly on actual voting behavior in real world elections, if possible.
Second, where we endowed all individuals with the same altruistic concern in
our analysis, a straightforward extension would be to study the equilibrium
outcomes resulting from the prevalence of di¤erent altruistic concerns among
the population; we refer to Galasso (2003) for a rst characterization of politico-
economic equilibria when purely selsh voters coexist with Rawlsian altruistic
voters and to Cappelen et al. (2005) for an experimental study of pluralism
in fairness ideals. Third, another possible extension of our model would be
to introduce dynamics, study the endogenous formation of (desert-sensitive)
altruistic preferences and analyze the (di¤erent) steady-state(s) resulting from
this process; see Cervellati et al. (2006) for a rst attempt. Fourth, we believe
that by endowing individuals with altruistic preferences for redistribution, the
qualitative results of positive voting models come closer to the recommendations
of the normative optimal fair income tax literature; we refer to Schokkaert et
al. (2004) for the derivation of optimal linear tax rates under a desert-sensitive
social planner. In fact, the (hypothetical) benevolent social planner of normative
analysis is being replaced by ethically inspired median voters in our analysis.
Finally (and well aware of the technical di¢ culties it imposes), the development
of models in which individuals with (desert-sensitive) altruistic preferences vote
over non-linear income tax schedules would obviously be an improvement; see
Kranich (2001) for an analysis with altruistic preferences over quadratic income
tax schedules. It would for example enable to study whether (desert-sensitive)
altruistic individuals are in favor of welfare programmes that subsidize the poor.
Appendix A: impact of incomplete information
We focus on the desert-sensitive utilitarian scenario for all economies in E 0, as
only here (possibly wrong) beliefs about the proportion of hard-working low-
skilled individuals inuence the amount of redistribution in the political equi-
librium. We take the Condorcet winner tax rate ~dsU;" under the (correct)
belief that pbwe = (1   ) as a benchmark. Denote this tax rate ~dsU;"benchmark.
We assume that, for all individuals,  is such that ~dsU;"benchmark > 0. From the
proposition in Section 3, we know that for all economies in E 0, ~dsU;" is the
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lowest Condorcet winner tax rate of the ve scenarios considered. We now
ask the question in which economies wrong beliefs (pbwe 6= (1   )) lead to a
~dsU;" that is even smaller than ~dsU;"benchmark. In other words, we try to identify
how wrong beliefs can further increase the di¤erence between the Condorcet
winner tax rate in the desert-sensitive utilitarian scenario and the Condorcet
winner tax rates in the other scenarios. The necessary condition to have that
~dsU;" < ~dsU;"benchmark is that individuals of type (w; e) underestimate the true
proportion of individuals of their own type, i.e. pbwe < (1 ). The intuition is
clear: this underestimation leads individuals of type (w; e) to an underestima-
tion in their social indirect utility function of the proportion of their own type
(w; e) relative to the proportion of individuals of type ( w; e). As individuals of
type ( w; e) egoistically prefer a lower tax rate than individuals of type (w; e), the
underestimation of the proportion of the latter type leads to a lower preferred
tax rate of individuals of type (w; e) in the desert-sensitive utilitarian altruism
scenario.
In order to study the exact formation of beliefs, it is important to distinguish
between the case where individuals know that w and e are independently distrib-
uted and the case where individuals do not know that w and e are independently
distributed.
Individuals know that w and e are independently distributed
When individuals know that w and e are independently distributed (i.e. indi-
viduals know that p we + pwe = (1  )+ (1  )), beliefs can only take two
di¤erent values, namely pbwe = (1   ) (which is correct) or pbwe = (1   )
(which is wrong). Let bE 0 = f" 2 E 0 :  < g be a proper subset of E 0 that com-
prises all economies in E 0 where there are more low-skilled individuals than lazy
individuals. The following proposition states that exactly for those economies
wrong beliefs lead to even lower levels of redistribution in the political equilib-
rium. This stems from the fact that in these economies (1   ) < (1   ),
which leads to an underestimation of the proportion of individuals of type (w; e)
and as a result to a smaller Condorcet winner tax rate (cfr. supra).
Proposition A1 (impact of imperfect information): When individuals
know that w and e are independently distributed and pbwe 6= (1  ):
8" 2 bE 0 : ~dsU;" < ~dsU;"benchmark.
Proof: The proof follows from a direct comparison between ~dsU;" when pbwe =
(1 ) and ~dsU;" when pbwe = (1 ). The latter is smaller than the former
when  < , which is the case for all economies in bE 0 . 
Individuals do not know that w and e are independently distributed
When individuals do not know that w and e are independently distributed,
beliefs can be situated anywhere in the closed interval between zero and 1 pwe 
pwe, i.e. pbwe 2 [0; + 2]. Let
bbE 0 = f" 2 bE 0 :  > 1=2g be a proper subset of
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bE 0 that comprises all economies in bE 0 where more than one half of the population
is low-skilled. The following proposition summarizes su¢ cient (not necessary)
conditions to have ~dsU;" < ~dsU;"benchmark. The most general result (which holds
for all economies in E 0) states that, in order to obtain ~dsU;" < ~dsU;"benchmark,
it is su¢ cient that individuals of type (w; e) believe that the majority of low-
skilled individuals are lazy or that individuals of type (w; e) believe that there
are more lazy individuals than hard-working individuals in society. Moreover,
for all economies in bE 0 , it is su¢ cient that individuals of type (w; e) believe
that most of the middle type individuals are lazy. Further, for all economies
in
bbE 0 , it is su¢ cient that individuals of type (w; e) believe that the majority of
hard-working individuals are also high skilled or that individuals of type (w; e)
believe that there are more high-skilled individuals than low-skilled individuals
in society. In all of these cases, these beliefs lead to an underestimation of the
proportion of individuals of type (w; e) and as a result to a smaller Condorcet
winner tax rate (cfr. supra).
Proposition A2 (impact of imperfect information): When individuals
do not know that w and e are independently distributed, any of the following
beliefs are su¢ cient to have ~dsU;" < ~dsU;"benchmark:
8" 2 E 0 : pbwe < pwe, pbwe < pwe + pbwe   pwe
8" 2 bE 0 : pbwe < pbwe
8" 2 bbE 0 : pbwe < pwe, pbwe < pbwe + pwe   pwe.
Proof: To prove that pbwe < pwe is su¢ cient, note that pwe =  is smaller than
(1   ) when  < 12 , which is the case for all economies in E 0. To prove that
pbwe < pwe+p
b
we pwe is su¢ cient, note that this amounts to pbwe < +   12 ,
since pbwe = +    2   pbwe. Then +       12 is smaller than (1  )
when  < 12 , which is the case for all economies in E 0. To prove that pbwe < pbwe
is su¢ cient, note that this amounts to pbwe <
+ 2
2 and that
+ 2
2 is
smaller than (1   ) when  < , which is the case for all economies in bE 0 .
To prove that pbwe < pwe is su¢ cient, note that pwe = (1  )(1  ) is smaller
than (1  ) when  > 12 , which is the case for all economies in
bbE 0 . To prove
that pbwe < p
b
we+pwe pwe is su¢ cient, note that this amounts to pbwe < 12  
and that 12    is smaller than (1  ) when  > 12 , which is the case for all
economies in
bbE 0 . 
Appendix B: descriptive summary and correla-
tion matrix
Table 5 provides a detailed descriptive summary of the data used in the logit
estimation presented in Section 4. It reports the exact questions used to dene
the variables and indicates for each variable the proportion of answers given.
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<insert Table 5 about here>
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix.
<insert Table 6 about here>
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 SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION 
SELF-INTEREST 0.308*** (0.032) 
0.315*** 
(0.031) 
POUM -0.060* (0.036) 
-0.060* 
(0.037) 
POUM * US -0.052 (0.035) 
0.045 
(0.036) 
HARD WORK  -0.180*** (0.045) 
HARD WORK * US  -0.196*** (0.040) 
INCOME_2 0.261** (0.126) 
0.257** 
(0.130) 
INCOME_3 -0.062 (0.091) 
-0.046 
(0.087) 
INCOME_4 -0.081 (0.170) 
-0.048 
(0.172) 
INCOME_5 -0.667*** (0.088) 
-0.615*** 
(0.086) 
UNEMPLOYED 0.183 (0.194) 
0.158 
(0.189) 
OTHERS NOT IN LABOUR FORCE -0.193*** (0.034) 
-0.171*** 
(0.045) 
EDUCATION_2 -0.680*** (0.051) 
-0.645*** 
(0.055) 
EDUCATION_3 -1.014*** (0.093) 
-0.983*** 
(0.107) 
EDUCATION_4 -1.441*** (0.073) 
-1.412*** 
(0.052) 
AGE_2 0.083 (0.060) 
0.063 
(0.075) 
AGE_3 -0.077 (0.095) 
-0.100 
(0.096) 
AGE_4 -0.249*** (0.123) 
-0.263** 
(0.118) 
AGE_5 -0.194*** (0.051) 
-0.218*** 
(0.072) 
AGE_6 -0.325*** (0.110) 
-0.354*** 
(0.120) 
MALE -0.164*** (0.066) 
-0.189*** 
(0.064) 
MARRIED -0.036 (0.111) 
-0.022 
(0.107) 
GREAT BRITAIN 0.130*** (0.042) 
0.216*** 
(0.035) 
NORWAY 0.176*** (0.055) 
0.211*** 
(0.045) 
ITALY 1.123*** (0.043) 
1.111*** 
(0.037) 
US -1.186*** (0.148) 
-0.212 
(0.264) 
   
Number of observations 4,043 4,007 
Log Pseudolikelihood -1,986.58 -1,958.56 
Pseudo R2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  12.08% 12.57% 
Standard errors clustered at the country level between parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Logit estimates 
  
EUROPE 
 
 
US 
 
 
MEAN 
 
ELASTICITY 
% 
MEAN 
 
ELASTICITY 
% 
SELF-INTEREST 3.488 0.19*** 3.758 0.52*** 
POUM 3.934 -0.04* 3.523 -0.09* 
POUM * US 0 0 3.523 0.07 
HARD WORK 3.740 -0.12*** 4.266 -0.34*** 
HARD WORK * US 0 0 4.266 -0.37*** 
INCOME_2 0.166 0.01** 0.220 0.02** 
INCOME_3 0.182 0.00 0.214 0.00 
INCOME_4 0.243 0.00 0.162 0.00 
INCOME_5 0.243 -0.03*** 0.207 -0.06*** 
UNEMPLOYED 0.030 0.00 0.034 0.00 
OTHERS NOT IN LABOUR FORCE 0.265 -0.01*** 0.098 -0.01*** 
 EDUCATION_2 0.432 -0.05*** 0.105 -0.03*** 
EDUCATION_3 0.298 -0.05*** 0.564 -0.25*** 
EDUCATION_4 0.166 -0.04*** 0.331 -0.21*** 
AGE_2 0.240 0.00 0.274 0.01 
AGE_3 0.224 0.00 0.315 -0.01 
AGE_4 0.177 -0.01*** 0.145 -0.02*** 
AGE_5 0.127 0.00*** 0.105 -0.01*** 
AGE_6 0.122 -0.01*** 0.049 -0.01*** 
MALE 0.560 -0.02*** 0.466 -0.04*** 
MARRIED 0.654 0.00 0.582 -0.01 
GREAT BRITAIN 0.142 0.01*** 0 0 
NORWAY 0.326 0.01*** 0 0 
ITALY 0.168 0.03*** 0 0 
US 0 0 1 -0.09 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Table 4: Elasticities 
Variable Question Answers Proportion (%) N=4,007 
    
REDISTRIBUTION 
‘It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the difference 
in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes’
=1: strongly disagree 
=2: disagree 
=3: neither agree nor disagree 
=4: agree 
=5: strongly disagree 
=1: 6.6 
=2: 18.1 
=3: 14.5  
=4: 40.2 
=5: 20.6 
SELF-INTEREST 
‘If incomes became more equal, 
some people would get higher 
incomes and some would get lower 
incomes. Do you think that your 
income…’ 
=1: would definitely go down 
=2: would probably go down 
=3: would stay the same 
=4: would probably go up 
=5: would definitely go up 
=1: 1.4 
=2: 7.1 
=3: 42.7  
=4: 34.1 
=5: 14.7 
 
POUM 
‘Compared to your father when he 
was about your age, are you better 
off or worse off in your income and 
standard of living generally?’ 
=1: much worse off 
=2: worse off 
=3: about equal 
=4: better off 
=5: much better off 
=1: 2.0 
=2: 9.9 
=3: 16.0 
=4: 44.2 
=5: 27.9 
 
HARD WORK ‘For getting ahead in life, how important is hard work?’ 
=1: not important at all 
=2: not very important 
=3: fairly important 
=4: very important 
=5: essential 
=1: 1.3 
=2: 5.8 
=3: 24.5 
=4: 44.8 
=5:23.5 
 
INCOME_N  
N=1: if belongs to the 1st quintile 
N=2: if belongs to the 2nd quintile 
N=3: if belongs to the 3rd quintile 
N=4: if belongs to the 4th quintile 
N=5: if belongs to the 5th quintile 
=1: 17.1 
=2: 17.6 
=3: 18.8 
=4: 22.9 
=5:23.7 
 
EMPLOYED  =1: if employed =0 otherwise =1: 73.3 
UNEMPLOYED  
=1: if unemployed 
=0 otherwise 
 
=1: 3.1  
OTHERS NOT IN 
LABOUR FORCE  
=1: if retired, if housewife, if 
student, if other inactive 
=0 otherwise 
 
=1: 23.6 
EDUCATION_N  
N=1: if no qualification or primary 
school 
N=2 if secondary school 
N=3 if high school 
N=4 if university 
 
=1: 8.6 
=2: 37.4 
=3: 34.5 
=4: 19.6 
AGE_N  
N=1: if under 24 
N=2: if between 25 and 34 
N=3: if between 35 and 44 
N=4: if between 45 and 54 
N=5: if between 55 and 64 
N=6: if above 65 
 
=1: 11.0 
=2: 24.6 
=3: 24.0 
=4: 17.2 
=5:12.3 
=6: 10.9 
 
MALE  
=1: if male 
=0: if female 
 
=1: 54.3 
MARRIED  
=1: if married or living as married 
=0 otherwise 
 
=1: 64.1 
GERMANY  =1: if Germany =0 otherwise =1: 29.9 
GREAT BRITAIN  =1: if Great Britain =0 otherwise =1: 11.7 
NORWAY  =1: if Norway =0 otherwise =1: 26.8 
ITALY  =1: if Italy =0 otherwise =1: 13.8 
US  
=1: if US 
=0 otherwise 
 
=1: 17.8 
 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
 REDISTRIBUTION SELF-
INTEREST POUM 
HARD 
WORK INCOME EMPLOYED EDUCATION AGE MALE MARRIED 
REDISTRIBUTION 1          
SELF-INTEREST 0.14*** 1         
POUM -0.02 -0.12*** 1        
HARD WORK -0.14*** 0.01 -0.01 1       
INCOME -0.17*** -0.27*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 1      
EMPLOYED -0.05*** -0.00 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.35*** 1     
EDUCATION -0.22*** -0.13*** -0.03** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.21*** 1    
AGE -0.03** -0.09*** 0.09*** -0.02 0.09*** -0.35*** -0.24*** 1   
MALE -0.07*** -0.11*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.40*** 0.06*** 0.03* 0.02 1  
MARRIED -0.04** -0.07*** 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.20*** 0.10*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.09*** 1 
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
Table 6: Correlation matrix 
Recent titles 
CORE Discussion Papers 
 
2008/16. Ana MAULEON, Vincent VANNETELBOSCH and Wouter VERGOTE. Von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching. 
2008/17. Tanguy ISAAC. Information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings: complete 
information revelation in dynamic analysis. 
2008/18. Juan D. MORENO-TERNERO and John E. ROEMER. Axiomatic resource allocation for 
heterogeneous agents. 
2008/19. Carlo CAPUANO and Giuseppe DE FEO. Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow cost of 
public funds. 
2008/20. Helmuth CREMER, Philippe DE DONDER, Dario MALDONADO and Pierre PESTIEAU. 
Forced saving, redistribution and nonlinear social security schemes. 
2008/21. Philippe CHEVALIER and Jean-Christophe VAN DEN SCHRIECK. Approximating multiple 
class queueing models with loss models. 
2008/22. Pierre PESTIEAU and Uri M. POSSEN. Interaction of defined benefit pension plans and social 
security. 
2008/23. Marco MARINUCCI. Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric 
partners. 
2008/24. Raouf BOUCEKKINE, Natali HRITONENKO and Yuri YATSENKO. Optimal firm behavior 
under environmental constraints. 
2008/25. Ana MAULEON, Vincent VANNETELBOSCH and Cecilia VERGARI. Market integration in 
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